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Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an anti-social emotion because the 
relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists 
this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is 
triggered by the envier’s sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality 
principle has been violated. Secondly, we introduce the notion of “hetero-induced self-
conscious emotions” by focusing on the paradigmatic cases of being ashamed or proud of 
somebody else. We describe envy as a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion by arguing (i) 
that the impotence felt by the subject grounds the emotion’s self-reflexivity and (ii) that the 
rival impacts the subject’s self-assessment because the rival is framed by the subject as an in-
group member. Finally, we elaborate on the asset at stake in envy. We contend that this is 
esteem recognition: the envier covets the esteem that her reference group accords to the rival. 
Since, in envy, the subject conceives of herself as member of a group to which the other is also 
understood to belong, we conclude that envy is a social emotion insofar as it presupposes a 
sense of us.  
 





Within emotion theory envy has been described as a purely individualistic emotion (see 
Schoeck, 1966): given the profound rivalry and hostility characterizing the emotion, envy has 
been claimed to exclude any sense of us. Yet, it has also been surmised that envy does have 
pro-social effects, although these effects are generally portrayed as a mere unintentional 
byproduct of the emotion. They can derive from envy avoidance: each individual, privately, 
has the intent to avoid being envied, thereby making their conducts more predictable and 
fostering uniform behavior (see Elster, 1989, p. 262). Or they can derive from the enjoyment 
one feels in being envied: each individual, privately, is motivated by the pleasure of being 
envied, thereby ending up “better off, not because they make an extra effort, but because of the 
extra effort of others” (Elster, 1989, p. 263). Or they are brought about because individuals, 
privately, are moved by episodes of envy against a target of the same kind, which fosters group 
cohesiveness (Freud, 1982). On this view, envy has even been labeled as “the cement” of 
society in the sense that society (understood as a mere aggregation of individuals) is glued 
together by the emotion.  
 
The main aim of this paper is to resist the standard view about envy and to argue that envy 
presupposes a sense of us.i The paper is organized in three sections. In the first, we compare 
emulative or benign envy to hostile or malicious envy. We argue that the first expression refers 
to a combination of different attitudes (desire for an asset and admiration or happiness for its 
owner, see Ben Ze’ev, 2000, p. 353). By contrast, ‘hostile envy’ identifies a single kind of 
emotion, which can be characterized as a self-conscious emotion or an emotion of negative 
self-assessment, insofar as the emotion is intentionally directed to its very subject, who 
evaluates herself as disempowered or as a loser when compared to the rival. In the second 
section, we elaborate on the structure of the emotion by pinpointing a second intentional 
relation, which the emotion enters with the rival. We highlight two phenomenological accents 
that the emotion can assume: when the accent is on hostility, the emotion is thematically 
directed at the rival and is non-thematically about the self. When the accent is on 
disempowerment, the converse is the case: the emotion is thematically directed at the self and 
is non-thematically about the other. This shows that, in envy, the other impacts the sense of 
self, which is a feature that envy shares with other self-conscious emotions, like shame and 
pride, when these emotions are induced by others. In the third and last section, we explore the 
idea that envy is group-based by looking at the third intentional relation this emotion enters 
with the desired good. We argue that a fundamental motive in envy is the desire to be esteemed 
by one’s in-group members (or to nourish one’s amour propre), which indicates that envy very 
much presupposes a sense of us, rather than marginally and unintentionally contributing to it. 
 
A methodological note before starting: although some of the arguments that we mount in these 
sections take considerations about language into account, this investigation is not intended as 
a contribution to ordinary language philosophy, nor is its intention to issue recommendations 
on how to regiment language so as to make it fit to the view presented here. Rather, our interest 
primarily goes to the phenomenology and the intentional structure of the emotive phenomena 
at issue. 
 
1. Envy as a hostile emotion 
 
Let us begin by considering what we take to be a paradigmatic example of envy, which is not 
entirely fictitious. Imagine two ice-skaters from the same country, Rob and Bob, who are both 
training to compete in the Olympics. Both of them are of almost the same age and have been 
proceeding in their sports careers at roughly the same pace. During the training sessions ahead 
of the Olympics, Rob comes to believe that Bob is in much better shape than him, and will 
certainly qualify for the competition, while Rob is very unlikely to qualify. Unable to bear the 
thought that Bob will get to compete in the Olympics, but Rob won’t, Rob hires a man to break 
Bob’s leg. This seems a clear case of an aggression motivated by envy: I wish something that 
somebody else has, and as a result I feel hostility towards the other.  
 
Two questions arise. First, how representative of envy is this example, really? Or more 
precisely: can there be instances of envy without hostility? And second: how does hostility 
come about, or: why does the desire for a good trigger hostility against the owner of that good? 
The current section will offer answers to these two questions, but before tackling them, it may 
be helpful to start homing in on envy by rehearsing the distinction drawn in the literature 
between envy and jealousy.  
 
Although the two terms ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ can often be used interchangeably in English 
(but this use is not permitted in other languages, e.g., in Romance languages like Spanish), 
there is increasing consensus that these two expressions refer to two distinct emotions 
(D’Arms, 2017; Protasi, 2017). Jealousy entails a relation among three persons: the subject, 
the beloved and the rival, whereas the persons involved in envy are only two: the subject and 
the rival. However, envy, too, can be described as entailing a three-place relation, insofar as 
the relation between the envier and the rival is mediated by a “good” that the rival possesses 
and the subject covets (see D’Arms, 2017, we conform to this terminology).ii Another crucial 
difference between these two emotions is that the object of jealousy (specifically: the affection 
of another person) is owned or enjoyed by the jealous subject, whereas this is not the case in 
envy. Jealousy is about protecting a privileged attachment you enjoy from someone who 
threatens it, as is the case when a child gets jealous of a newborn sibling, because this baby 
now ‘steals’ some of the attention the child used to receive from their parents. Envy, by 
contrast, presupposes the desire of a good that is not owned by the subject, but by somebody 
else, i.e., the rival. Envy, therefore, is about coveting a good owned by the rival, like Rob 
desiring to have Bob’s ability to qualify for the Olympics.  
 
The word ‘envy’ has assumed extremely negative connotations because paradigmatic cases of 
envy involve overt hostility towards the rival. Indeed, the Christian tradition condemns it as 
one of the seven deadly sins. This might be one of the reasons why in some situations English 
speakers tend to use the word ‘jealousy’ instead of ‘envy’, thus signaling that they desire 
something someone else has, while highlighting that they feel no animosity towards the owner 
of the good. For example, you might tell a friend that you are jealous of them when you see 
their pictures of their beautiful beach holiday. If you do use the word ‘envy’ in such a situation, 
chances are you will use a joking tone, or be quick to clarify you mean no harm. Some 
languages signal this by using expressions such as ‘healthy envy’ (‘envidia sana’ in Spanish or 
‘sana invidia’ in Italian).  
 
These observations about language usage suggest that envy can come in a hostile and a non-
hostile form, and indeed, the distinction between malicious and benign envy is frequent both 
in philosophy and psychology (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009; Smith & Kim, 2007). 
The question is whether these two phenomena can be classified as forms of the same emotion: 
are they both envy? This is disputed. Some philosophers argue that envy is always hostile to a 
higher or lesser degree (cf. D’Arms & Kerr, 2008; Ben Ze’ev, 2000, p. 304), and that so-called 
benign envy, if anything, is a different emotion. Some others think that envy can indeed come 
in a non-hostile variety, often called ‘emulation’ (Kristjánsson, 2002, p. 139), ‘emulative envy’ 
(Protasi, 2016, p. 540), or ‘admiring envy’ (Neu, 1980, p. 433).  
 
Our contention is that these two phenomena (benign and malicious envy) are quite distinct and 
deserve to be classified separately, and that the emotion of envy always involves hostility to a 
higher or lesser degree. To see why, let us compare both phenomena, which will also help us 
illustrate some of envy’s most important traits. Protasi (2016, p. 540) gives an example of what 
she calls ‘emulative envy’: PhD student Emma aspires to the same level of philosophical 
excellence as her advisor, Diotima, and (benignly) envies her for it. Protasi contends that this 
form of envy is characterized by squarely targeting the good, which is perceived as attainable, 
and striving to achieve it, without experiencing hostility or attempting to harm the rival, who 
functions only as a role model. In contrast, in our example above Rob perceived the good 
(qualifying for the Olympics) as unattainable, he felt hostile toward Bob and tried to harm him. 
The question here is whether the envy Emma is purported to feel towards Diotima, and the 
envy that Rob feels towards Bob, are different forms of the same kind of mental state. We do 
not think so. In our view, the cases that are typically classified as ‘benign envy’ are either 
instances of (hostile) envy that, for whichever reason, are very low in emotional intensity or 
involve a low degree of hostility, thus making it relatively easy for the subject to control it, 
manage it productively or even dismiss it. Or they are not envy at all, but a combination of 
different mental states (generally: admiration plus a desire for the good the other possesses).  
 
To begin with, the what-it-is-likeness of hostile envy, its qualitative or phenomenological 
character (Nagel, 1974), cannot be equated to the what-it-is-likeness of benign envy. There is 
general agreement upon the idea that benign envy entails some form of positive or appreciative 
admiration—which certainly cannot be aligned with the spiteful note that qualifies envy—and 
is said to be “only mildly aversive” (Protasi, 2016, p. 540) and not hostile towards the rival. If 
this is so, the absence of hostility can be held to constitute a crucial phenomenological 
difference. But on closer inspection, it is not so clear that ‘emulative envy’ does not involve 
hostility. Protasi (2016, p. 541) herself cites empirical evidence that benign, or emulative, envy 
is unpleasant, difficult to confess and is associated with shame. In our view, the association 
with shame and the difficulty to confess it both speak in favor of the idea that ‘emulative envy’ 
does involve some hostility towards the other: feeling hostility towards someone is in principle 
incompatible with admiring, respecting or loving them. This ambivalence in one’s feelings 
towards someone one holds dear can easily give rise to a meta-emotion of shame or guilt: 
shame about being the petty kind of person who envies those he also loves.  
 
So far it might seem we are only stipulating that envy must involve hostility, which would 
easily invite the accusation that this move is question-begging (Protasi, 2016, p. 541). Hence, 
let us now ponder the possibility that benign envy is entirely free of hostility. Consider the 
following argument: envy is an intentional state and, as such, can be analyzed as having an 
intentional content and a ‘mode’ (Searle, 1983; or ‘manner,’ cf. Chalmers, 2004). If a dear 
friend comes into possession of an asset, this may instigate my envy, but also my joy. Here, 
the content of the emotions is the same, but their modes differ. But clearly, it is also possible 
for a subject to feel emotions of the same kind, but directed at different contents: I envy my 
neighbor’s car, but I also envy my friend’s generous character. Protasi (2016) has tried to trace 
the difference between malicious envy and benign forms of envy back to their contents: 
accordingly, the focus of benign envy would be on an achievable good, whereas malicious 
envy would focus on the rival. Yet, as we have seen, benign envy feels like radically differently 
from what hostile envy feels like – especially if we assume that no hostility at all is involved 
in the first emotion. Now, it has been claimed that the what-it-is-likeness of a state is 
determined not only by the content, but also by the mode of this state (Zahavi, 2005, p. 116f) 
and perhaps predominantly so (cf. Teroni, 2017). Seeing that it is raining feels like different 
from seeing that it is sunny, but seeing that it is raining certainly also feels like differently from 
wishing that it is raining. If so, then the difference between these two forms of envy must also 
be assessed at the level of their modes and not (only) of their contents. 
 
The question then arises of how the mode of these two different emotions can be described 
more precisely. It seems plausible to argue that the mode of benign envy (were this to 
completely lack hostility) results from the combination of admiration (or “happy-for”, Ben 
Ze’ev, 2000, p. 353) and the desire for the good that someone else possesses. In particular, if 
somebody has achieved a good we also desire, and is believed to have done so by their own 
merits, this typically triggers our admiration. Especially if we know the person and care about 
them, this can also make us “happy for” them (see Ben-Ze’ev 2000, chap. 12). In this case, a 
three-place relation between a subject, a desired good and the owner of that good can be 
structurally parallel to envy, without involving any hostility. However, an unpleasant note may 
sometimes characterize episodes of benign envy (see van de Ven et al., 2009). Why? We 
surmise that this is caused by the desire component: desires that are not fulfilled are 
characteristically unpleasant (precisely because they are unmet). Yet, desires, whether painful 
or not, combined with admiration (or “happy-for”) do not yet identify a single kind of mental 
state. Put another way, the association (as strong as one wishes) between two mental states is 
not itself a mental state. But then what about the mode of hostile envy? How is this mode to be 
described? 
 
To find an answer to this question, let us look more closely at the desire that underlies envy. 
On a widely-accepted view (see Davidson, 2002), desires motivate to act when coupled with 
beliefs – and especially, with the belief that the good is achievable: if a good is deemed to be 
achievable, generally the subject attempts to acquire it. Clearly, the strategy that the agent will 
put in place very much depends on many different factors: on the character of the person, on 
the sort of good at stake, on the circumstances related to its attainment, etc. Developing a virtue 
like generosity (which you conceive of as an asset that, e.g., your colleague has) presupposes 
a very different course of actions from reaching the goal of publishing a paper on a top-rated 
journal (like the one your colleague recently published). Yet both goods, at least in principle, 
can be regarded by the agent as achievable. Also, the moral profile of the strategy may differ: 
the good can be acquired thanks to the agent’s personal effort alone or it can be acquired as a 
result of morally blameworthy actions. For instance, the agent may steal the good from its 
owner and, consequently, harm the owner.  
 
It may be helpful to dwell on this last scenario a bit longer: suppose that, in the morally 
problematic case, the owner also happens to be the target of the agent’s hatred. In this case, it 
obviously makes a difference whether the harm (stealing something from somebody else) is 
inflicted because of the malicious intention of achieving the good or because of hatred. To 
come back to our initial example: it makes a difference whether Rob breaks Bob’s leg because 
Rob thinks that, by eliminating his main rival, he can qualify for the Olympics, or whether he 
does that simply because he hates Bob (maybe knowing that this will not enable him to be 
qualified). Certainly, the action can be triggered by both mental states at once and in many 
real-life cases it would be almost impossible to precisely discern the motivating factor. Yet the 
important point is that, if the action is motivated by hatred, then hatred itself must be motivated 
by something different from the mere desire for the good, were hatred to be qualified as envy. 
In fact, it remains unintelligible why the mere desire for something owned by somebody else 
in and of itself may lead to (envious) hostility against the good’s owner (unless one is willing 
to claim that envy is always and intrinsically irrational – but nobody in the debate, as far we 
can see, holds this viewiii). Think again about Bob and Rob, but now in a different situation: if 
Bob desires the same car Rob has, and Bob is able to afford it and buy it (or steal it!) at any 
time he chooses, it would be difficult to see why Bob’s desire for Rob’s car should trigger any 
hatred or hostility towards Rob. So, what motivates the (alleged) component of hatred in envy? 
 
The conjecture is that envy is triggered by a feeling of impotence on the subject’s end (Scheler, 
1994) combined with a similarity condition. More specifically, the subject’s desire to possess 
the good is frustrated by the feeling that she cannot achieve it, while she witnesses that 
someone very similar to her can. There might be various causes for this feeling of impotence 
(which may or may not be justified): e.g., the subject may know that the good is a numerically 
non-repeatable entity (like winning the Gold medal in one specialty at the Olympics) or she 
may be convinced that the reason why she does not possess the good is because the rival has 
it. Also, she may believe that the reason why she does not possess the good is due to systemic 
factors such as injustice or destiny, etc. This unachievability, however, is experienced by the 
envious subject as contingent, not as necessary: given my merits, if the world were different, I 
could be the one that had the good (Elster, 1998, p. 169; Smith & Kim, 2007, p. 51). Indeed, 
the fact that the rival - somebody so similar to me - possesses the good just goes to show that 
someone like me can have it. But something blocks my way at the moment and I feel impotent. 
Obviously, the subject may be wrong in experiencing the good as unachievable, but what 
counts is that the feeling of impotence conduces to a characteristic pattern of counterfactual 
inferences that is premised on an equality principle.iv These inferences can be formulated 
loosely as follow: 
 
Given the equality principle: 
(1) If it were true that the other has achieved the good in virtue of his/her merits, then 
it should have been possible for my desire for the good to be satisfied.  
(2) But (I believe that) my desire for the good cannot be satisfied, therefore it must be 
the case that the other does not own the good in virtue of his/her merits. 
 
To elaborate on this: if, in envy, the good is thought to be achievable, then the desire for it 
should motivate the subject to act and it would remain unexplained why the agent develops 
hostility against the owner. By contrast, the profoundly painful and disturbing quality of envy 
can be explained by the tension between the individual desire for a good owned by somebody 
else and the feeling of impotence in securing that good. Yet, this tension per se would not be 
able to explain the hostility felt against the rival (and indeed, if the other is perceived as 
thoroughly and deservedly superior, envy is far less likely to appear, Smith & Kim, 2007, p. 
51). The crucial elements to explain hostility here are, hence, desert and the violation of the 
equality principle: if the other deserved the good, I should have deserved it too. After all, there 
is no difference in status between me and the other. But the good is beyond my reach, so the 
other does not deserve it either, for the other hasn’t acquired it thanks to his or her merit. And 
that is why the rival is begrudged and target of hostility. Furthermore, as Aristotle suggests 
(Rhet. II 1388a), envy reaches its peak of unpleasantness when the subject, in addition to 
feeling impotent, also feels hopeless that the world will ever sustain their desire for the good. 
Protasi (2016, pp. 541-543) seems to agree, given her description of ‘inert’ envy. 
 
Does this make envy a moral emotion? There is a complex ongoing debate between those who 
think that envy is not a moral emotion, that it is immoral or at best neutral (see e.g., D’Arms, 
2017; Ben-Ze’ev, 2002, 1992), and those who think that envy is a moral emotion, because it 
requires a sense of justice and a motivation to remedy injustices or inequalities (Thomason, 
2015; La Caze, 2001). We do not want to enter this debate, but it is important to emphasize 
that the way in which the notion of equality enters into the picture here is entirely perspectival, 
so to speak. The subject assesses a given state of affairs as unequal not from an objective point 
of view, but from her individual perspective. This is nicely captured by Miceli and 
Castelfranchi: “[…] a special kind of inequality is likely to motivate the envier’s feeling: his 
own inequality, which should consist in his own inferiority. Were he the advantaged one, we 
doubt he would feel indignation at the sight of this unequal distribution.” (Miceli & 
Castelfranchi, 2007, p. 461).v To push this line of reasoning further, even if (objectively) the 
rival achieves the good because of his merit (and hence deserves the good), the subject will 
still consider the other a target of hostility – precisely because the subject does not possess the 
good, which instigates the inference that, if the other owns the good, it would be fair (from the 
subject’s own perspective, that is!) for him or her to be in a position of owning it, too. But since 
this possibility is precluded to the envier, it is subjectively unfair for the rival to own the good.vi 
The same can be said for cases in which the rival achieves the good by mere luck and thus has 
no direct responsibility in its acquisition – here again, not possessing the good is taken as the 
premise of a similar pattern of inferences. 
 
All this establishes that envy presupposes the desire for a good that is regarded as unachievable 
by the subject and it also necessarily involves hostility against the rival. Often, this hostility is 
cashed out in terms of the desire that the rival loses the good, which can motivate the subject’s 
aggressive behavior. Certainly, this desire represents an important element of hostility, but it 
is not the only one: given that the other as such is the target of hostility, whatever harm or 
injury suffered by the rival is likely to trigger Schadenfreude in the subject (see van Dijk, 
Ouwerkerk, Smith, & Cikara, 2015). The main point of envy is not necessarily depriving the 
other of the good, but rather that “one wants to lower the other (to one’s own level or below)” 
(Neu, 1980, p. 343) through any available means. Accordingly, envy can dissolve when the 
other, while still owning the asset, suffers a harm that is perceived by the subject to be 
disproportionate with respect to the (perceived) offence of possessing the good without merit.  
 
But then, could not one run the same argument used above against the idea that benign envy 
identifies a single kind of mental state? Couldn’t envy be accounted for in terms of a 
combination of the desire for a good that is not currently possessed by the subject and by hatred 
or ill-will against the rival? If that were the case, then neither benign envy nor malicious envy 
would pinpoint a single kind of mental state. The following section develops considerations in 
favor of the idea that envy does identify a single kind of emotion.vii 
 
2. Envy as a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion 
 
First, envy can certainly ground hatred: consider, e.g., the phenomenon of class hatred, where 
certain people are hated because—at least on some interpretation—they belong to a class of 
envied people (the bourgeois, say). But if one emotion can motivate the other, then hatred – as 
a specific emotional response towards the other – must differ from envy. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the intentional structures of hatred and envy are drastically different: there is 
widespread agreement in the literature that hatred is directed against the other in the light of 
the disvalues that he or she exemplifies.viii The other is hatred’s intentional object and this 
makes the mental structure of this emotion relatively simple. Envy is a much more complex 
affair given that, we submit, the self is invested in this emotion: “Envy pertains to the idea that 
we have of ourselves, what makes our difference, our identity, it touches us at our very core.” 
(Rochat, 2014, p. 39; referring to Moessinger, 2000; see also Parrott, 1991; Ben-Ze’ev, 1992). 
To understand why, let us go back to the sense of impotence mentioned above. 
 
Once the subject develops a feeling of impotence with respect to the achievement of the good, 
the presence of the good in the hands of the rival reveals to the subject her own relative 
inferiority, or her disempowerment, with respect to the rival. This feeling of disempowerment 
is a form of negative self-assessment, which implies self-awareness. This is conducive to the 
idea that envy, in contrast to hatred, ought to be regarded as a “self-conscious emotion.” The 
label “self-conscious emotions” refers to the fact that these emotions intentionally target the 
self of the emoter.ix That is, in envy the subject is intentionally directed at the very envier, and 
not only at the rival.x  
 
Self-conscious emotions like shame and pride are characterized by the fact that these emotions 
are of or about the self: what is evaluated in these experiences is the one that has them (see 
Tracy, Robins & Tangney, 2007). Imagine the first mate of a sinking ship (like the main 
character of Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim) who abandons it in terror, instead of doing his duty 
and staying behind to make sure all the passengers are safely evacuated, and once he arrives 
on firm land, he feels deeply ashamed of his own cowardice. His shame is not simply directed 
at the act of abandoning the ship; he is ashamed of himself because he abandoned the ship. He 
evaluates himself negatively (he is the target of the emotion) in light of the situation that caused 
his shame. Similarly, envy has a self-conscious structure, where the emoter evaluates him- or 
herself negatively in light of a comparison with the rival: the envier feels disempowered or 
disadvantaged with respect to the rival because he or she is impotent with respect to the 
acquisition of the asset.xi  
 
If this line of reasoning is on the right track, then there is a reason for claiming that, in 
contradistinction to benign envy, the expression ‘malign’ envy does identify a single kind of 
emotion:xii it is because malign envy is a self-conscious emotion, that it cannot be reduced to a 
mere combination of unsatisfiable desire and hatred. The two intentional states of desire and 
hatred are not (necessarily) about the self and do not (necessarily) involve any self-evaluation, 
whereas envy always is about (among other things) a self that is assessed as disadvantaged.  
 
Yet, the idea that the self plays a role in the intentional horizon of envy asks for further 
clarification. We have seen that the self-assessment involved in envy – more precisely: the 
sense of disempowerment attached to the emotion – is grounded in a comparison with the rival. 
We shall uncover the preconditions of this comparison in section 3, but for the time being let 
us focus on the cognitive and emotive result of this comparison, as it were: Bob has a good that 
Rob feels is not in a position to achieve. Whatever the source of this feeling of unachievability 
may be, Rob is confronted with the brute fact that Bob has something Rob literally does not 
and (believes) cannot possess. Rob is therefore impotent and Bob is a target of hostility.  
 
The dialectic between disempowerment and hostility provides envy a Janus-faced intentional 
structure. More precisely, it puts the target and the focus of the emotion in oscillation. We 
understand the notions of ‘target’ and ‘focus’ of an emotion in line with Helm’s account (Helm, 
2010, p. 58). The target of the emotion is its intentional and thematic object – if you fear a 
barking dog, the barking dog is the target of fear. The focus, by contrast, is the background 
non-thematic object having import to which the target is related in such a way as to make 
intelligible the target’s having the property defined by the formal object: if you fear a barking 
dog, the focus is on you and your well-being. It is because your well-being is threatened by the 
dog that the dog’s dangerousness is intelligible (and the emotion of fear justified). The focus 
of concern must not always lie on the emoting subject, though: if you observe a dog barking at 
a child in a park, your emotion of fear has the dog as its target, but the child and his well-being 
as its focus.  
 
In the light of the distinction between focus and target, we conjecture that envy has two 
phenomenological accents: when the accent is on hostility, then the rival is the target of the 
emotion. The subject’s thematic consciousness is about the rival, but the peripheral or non-
thematic consciousness is about the self, which is the background object of the emotion. Envy, 
in this case, is made intelligible by the sense of impotence. The more one feels impotent, the 
more the other is resented. Envy’s second accent is on disempowerment and the associated 
localized negative self-assessment: here, the emotion has the self in target position and the rival 
in the focus: it is in virtue of the rival’s (perceived) superiority that the negative evaluation 
about the self is made intelligible.xiii  
 
The investment of the self in both accents of envy can also provide an explanation of a feature 
that has been often remarked as a trademark of malign envy, because it is not displayed by 
benign envy. This is the fact that, whereas the subject generally does not experience any or 
only little psychological friction in reporting emulative envy, the psychological tendency in 
malicious envy is to keep the emotion hidden, to not report it, and to transform it so as to avoid 
acknowledging it even to oneself (see Smith & Kim, 2007, pp. 54-57). Moreover, when envy 
is imputed to the subject by a third party, the subject reacts with overt denial or shame (Miceli 
& Castelfranchi, 2007), if not anger. We gather that the reason for this tendency consists in the 
fact that making envy manifest or being addressed as an envious person literally unveils the 
self and the negative self-assessment under which it has been put. In particular, it reveals to 
others that the subject not only assesses herself as disempowered, as a loser, but also that she 
assigns importance and relevance to the rival in assessing herself (and this notwithstanding the 
fact that the rival is begrudged). 
 
Furthermore, another fact can provide the current proposal with more persuasive power: other 
self-conscious emotions show an intentional structure of a complexity similar to that of envy. 
They can be hetero-induced in the technical sense that one’s own self-assessment can be based 
on facts about others (other authors would refer to these emotions as ‘vicarious’) (see Salice & 
Montes Sánchez 2016).xiv In particular, shame and pride are emotions that can be easily induced 
by others in this sense: in great many cases, one feels shame or pride not only because of what 
one has done, but also because of what somebody else has done. The other, that is, is able to 
impact the sense of self so as to make it possible that the subject feels ashamed or proud of 
what the other has done (hence affecting the corresponding self-assessments). In these 
emotions, one can observe the same intentional structure ascribed above to envy. This structure 
is not only concerned with the very self of the emoting subject, but also with the other (see 
Salice & Montes Sánchez 2016). Just as in envy, so in hetero-induced pride and shame, too, 
one can observe an oscillation between the non-thematic and the thematic object of the 
emotion: in some cases, the emotion of hetero-induced pride (or shame) is more centered on 
the subject, while, in others, it is more centered on the other. For instance, consider cases in 
which a fan feels proud of herself because her sport team has won the match: the fan generally 
attempts to underline the fact that she is the one who supports the winning team. In other cases, 
however, it is the other who plays a more ostensive role. To see this, consider how parents 
feeling proud of their children, while talking to other parents, direct the hearers’ attention to 
their children rather than to themselves. Whereas in the first example the phenomenological 
accent of the emotion is put on the subject, in the second case, the accent is put on the other.  
 
Given the close similarities between envy and other self-conscious emotions, our interim 
conclusion is that envy is a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion in line with hetero-induced 
shame and pride. For envy, too, as we have highlighted above, is characterized by the fact that 
the self is evaluated in the light of the other. However, this is not to deny important differences 
between hetero-induced shame and pride, and envy. The main difference between these 
emotions is that it is not possible for envy to come about in a non-hetero-induced form (but 
this is certainly the case in shame and pride). Also, in hetero-induced pride and shame, the way 
in which I evaluate myself parallels the way in which I evaluate the other, but this does not 
apply to envy. In envy, the evaluation of myself and of the other are not aligned: my negative 
evaluation of myself as impotent to achieve a good can coexist with a positive evaluation of 
the rival as empowered to achieve that good.xv  
 
Despite these differences, the clear analogy between these emotions directly leads to a further 
thought: one promising way to understand hetero-induced shame and pride is by assuming that 
the emoting subject has “group-identified” with the shameful or admirable other (see Salice & 
Montes Sánchez, 2016; Montes Sánchez & Salice, 2017). To put this differently, since the 
subject conceives of herself as a member of the same group to which the other is also perceived 
to belong, the other’s actions gain relevance for the subject. By conceiving of herself as group 
member, the subject acquires a social identity or a social self (a representation of oneself as 
group member) and, hence, one important presupposition for the occurrence of hetero-induced 
shame and pride is the capacity of the self to assume a distinctly social identity. Hence, these 
emotive reactions are intrinsically social and presuppose a sense of us. If applied to envy, this 
observation opens up a seemingly contra-intuitive possibility: if hetero-inducement has to be 
linked to sociality and if envy is an essentially hetero-induced emotion, does it follow that envy 
is a social emotion that requires for its occurrence a sense of us? This view flies in the face of 
the deep-seated intuitions we mentioned in the introduction, but we think there are good 
reasons for revising those individualistic intuitions. It is to this issue that we turn in the next 
section. 
 
3. Envy as a group-based emotion 
 
We put forward two considerations for showing that envy presupposes a sense of us and, hence, 
that it belongs to the class of group-based emotions. The first line of reasoning aims at unveiling 
that explicit or direct group identification is a factor that can trigger envy when it is combined 
with the other factors mentioned in the previous Sections. The second line of reasoning invokes 
the notion of implicit or indirect group identification and purports to show that this form of 
identification is always present when envy is elicited.  
 
The first consideration takes its first step from the idea mentioned in section 2 according to 
which envy presupposes comparison: for envy to be triggered, Rob must compare himself with 
Bob. The idea that comparison is quintessential to envy is fairly uncontroversial in the 
literature, and it is largely recognized that comparison tracks similarity (Rhet. II 1388a). The 
subject, through comparison with the other, becomes aware of similarities that justify the 
application of the equality principle when assessing the other and the other’s possession of the 
good. It is because Rob is similar to Bob that Rob thinks he is entitled to be qualified to the 
Olympics - just as Bob is.  
 
Yet similarity alone is not enough. On the one hand, similarity is cheap and everywhere. In 
Davidson’s (1978) words, “all similes are true… because everything is like everything”. But 
then what are the factors that assign relevance to one specific relation of similarity and not to 
others? On the other hand, it is generally assumed that similarity comes in degrees and envy is 
triggered only if the similarity between individuals is relatively high. The psychological 
tendency being that, when comparison detects low similarity between the subject and the other, 
the subject will not feel envy towards the other. For instance, Rob would not be envious of 
gold-medalist Bob, were Rob not an ice-skater, but only an ice-skating fan. Yet, it seems 
perfectly possible that low-level similarity can be superseded by other factors: in the example, 
were Rob and Bob siblings, it would be much more likely for Rob to indeed develop envy 
towards Bob, despite the large objective dissimilarity between their athletic abilities. 
 
If this is on the right track, it indicates that objective similarity as such is not able to account 
for the elicitation of envy (cf. Schmid, 2012, p. 425). What matters are rather the elements that 
assign salience to certain relations of similarity rather than others. Now, we surmise that one 
such element is the subject’s construal of the other as an in-group member. Framing the other 
as an in-group member assigns salience to given similarities - regardless of how loose or narrow 
these similarities are. In fact, one could even hypothesize that the less intense the similarity is, 
the more intense the social identification with the other must be for this similarity to motivate 
envy (as the example with Rob and Bob shows). 
 
Framing the other as an in-group member requires the subject to have group-identified. To 
frame somebody else as an in-group member presupposes that the subject already understands 
herself as a member of that group: call this understanding a ‘social self’ (see Brewer & Gardner, 
1996). Importantly, the activation of a social self precisely is what the psychological process 
of group identification delivers (Turner, 1982). Note that, in line with the notion of group 
identification in social psychology, the form of group membership we are interested in here is 
subjective, not objective. One can be member of several groups in virtue of, e.g., institutional 
factors (such as having a UK passport or being a first-year philosophy student) without the 
subject identifying with those groups, sometimes without the subject even being aware of those 
memberships. Yet, this does not amount to the “subjective” or psychological group 
membership social psychologists are interested in. By contrast, it is precisely when the subject 
has acquired an understanding of herself as member of a social group (us) and, hence, has 
group-identified, that social identity becomes an integral part of the self-concept and that the 
subject displays a social self. When the subject’s sense of self is impacted in this way, a 
subjective form of group membership is established: “we are concerned here with group 
membership as a psychological and not a formal-institutional state, with the subjective sense 
of togetherness, we-ness, or belongingness which indicates the formation of a psychological 
group” (Turner, 1982, p. 16). Hence, whether the rival actually is an in-group member is only 
peripherally relevant to envy somebody. What matters rather is how the subject understands 
herself and the other. 
 
Intense research in social psychology over the past fifty years has ascertained that this process 
can be elicited with great ease. It suffices that the subject perceives certain group cues in the 
environment - such as belonging to the same social category, having common interests, sharing 
common fate, facing a competing group, employing we-language etc. (Bacharach, 2006, p. 76) 
- for this process to set off. That is, to frame somebody as in-group member does not require 
the subject to have activated a particularly complex cognitive machinery, which is conducive 
to the developmentally early onset of the emotion.xvi  
 
But now, if it is true that one factor able to trigger envy is similarity, when this is accompanied 
by subjective group membership, it is also true that this is only one fact. Meaning that there are 
no sufficiently cogent reasons for maintaining that group identification is the only one factor 
that contributes to the elicitation of envy by assigning salience to certain relation of similarity. 
Other factors can and do play a role as well (see Alicke & Zell, 2008). This suggests that group 
identification can trigger envy, but also that there could be episodes of envy that do not hinge 
on a sense of us. At this stage, our second consideration can come to the fore.  
 
Recall that envy puts the subject in a ternary relation: the emotion is about the self, but it also 
is about the other and about the good. Given the high variability of the goods that can be at 
stake in envy (material objects, character’s traits, etc.), the attempt of developing a taxonomy 
of those goods may appear as hopeless (but see Klages, 1924, p. 118ff, for an attempt). Yet, 
one may ask about the reasons that the subject has for his or her preoccupation with a particular 
good. Why, in other words, a particular material, abstract or spiritual object catches the 
attention of the subject? It seems rather unproblematic to contend that this has to do with the 
fact that the object exemplifies particular values.xvii The object is desired because of certain 
values that it is perceived to exemplify (or: the object is evaluated positively by the subject).  
 
But which values are at stake here? Certainly, the object must have intrinsic desirability, but 
we surmise that the values that are core to envy are not the values that the object bears per se, 
intrinsically. This is illustrated by two psychological facts. The first is the tendency of the 
subject to destroy the other’s assets when they cannot be gained: as we have seen, the hostility 
that infuses envy often manifests itself in a desire to destroy the assets had by the rival. For 
example, when a child breaks another child’s toy because he cannot get it, or, in a more indirect 
or repressed way, when an envious neighbor scratches in passing your brand-new sports car 
with the keys of her cheap second-hand car. The thought behind such actions would be, “if I 
can’t have it, neither should you”. Recall Dorothy Sayers’ (1943) much quoted sentence: “Envy 
is the great leveler: if it cannot level things up, it will level them down”. The motivation for 
destroying or damaging the asset derives from the intention to harm the rival or bring her down 
to one’s own level by any means available, but we think that, if the preoccupation about the 
good were grounded solely in the values that the object bears per se, this would create a 
constant and solid counter-motive against the destruction of the good. The second fact is the 
associated tendency to reject the good once this has become available to the subject – a 
tendency that is most visible in children’s behavior: when, finally, they are offered the good 
desired and owned by some of their peers, it is not uncommon to observe that children refuse 
it. Here, again, it would remain unexplained why the subject is willing to give up on the asset, 
if its values are the only aspects at stake in envy. 
 
So, if the intrinsic values of the good are not (at least, the sole) element that the subject is 
concerned with in envy, then what are the other relevant values here? We believe that these are 
the values that ensure or increase social recognition, the values that can alter a person’s “level” 
vis-à-vis others. Now, recognition is a notoriously complex notion (see Iser, 2013) and, 
according to one particularly influential view, it comes in at least three different forms: respect, 
love, and esteem (Honneth, 1995). What sense of recognition is core to envy? 
 
The concept of recognition, as it is generally used in political philosophy and the philosophy 
of law, is a moral notion and it mostly refers to respect: the recognition of a person’s dignity 
and autonomy. As Neuhouser (2008, p. 62) puts it, respecting others “involves recognizing 
their fundamental dignity as human beings—as beings whose interests and desires place moral 
constraints on others’ actions”. This is not the good most relevantly at stake in envy. The 
absence of recognition in the sense of respect—think about marginalized groups, like African 
illegal immigrants or asylum seekers in Europe, or the homeless—typically produces feelings 
of humiliation rather than envy. Envy is much more likely to arise between people like Bob 
and Rob, both of whom enjoy respect recognition and are competing for something else.  
 
What about recognition in the sense of love? Is it relevant for envy? One can certainly desire 
to be loved and envy those who are loved (this might be an intuitively plausible explanation of 
sibling rivalry, for example), but if what you really desire is genuine love (and not something 
else), then bringing the rival down won’t do the job. Leveling will not satisfy you in any way. 
The only thing that can satisfy our longing for love is achieving genuine love for oneself, and 
this doesn’t depend on the rival. Therefore, we submit that love cannot be the form of 
recognition that is central to envy.  
 
In our view, what is predominantly relevant for envy is esteem recognition. As Neuhouser 
(2008, p. 62) puts it, “to esteem someone is to regard him as worthy of praise, admiration, or 
emulation for some specific quality or achievement. Unlike respect, esteem is not a recognition 
of rights that individuals enjoy in virtue of possessing a certain status (as beings of a certain 
sort) but a valuing of persons that involves a positive appraisal of the esteemed person’s 
particular qualities or achievements”. What is at stake in envy is what Neuhouser (2008, ch. 
1), following Rousseau, calls amour-propre. Amour-propre is a form of self-love that depends 
on what others think of you; it involves the desire to be admired or valued, “to have a certain 
standing in relation to the standing of some group of relevant others” (Neuhouser, 2008, p. 32). 
This is nicely illustrated in an interview with O.J. Simpson, where he says: “There’s a lot of 
things I need as a person. You know. I need, uh… I need that recognition. I think that, uh, 
what… what is driving O.J. Simpson is that need to be number one, that need to be liked. That 
need to be said, ‘Hey, that’s O.J. Simpson!’ When I walk down the street, I want people to 
know me” (Edelman, 2016). This, we contend, is the kind of recognition at stake in envyxviii: 
what one desires is the esteem associated with possessing certain goods. 
 
Thus, in our view, there are two assets that play a role in envy: a superficial and a deep asset. 
The superficial good one strives for in envy exemplifies values that are assessed as relevant 
from the perspective of the envier’s group (those values are the values of the group, cf. Schmid, 
2012, p. 430) to the effect that owning a good that exemplifies those values delivers peers’ 
esteem recognition. The superficial good has symbolic valence: the subject desires the good 
not (or at least: not exclusively) in its own right, but rather for the esteem that it can secure. 
We believe that this can neatly explain the two tendencies mentioned above: by destroying the 
good, the subject aims at depriving its owner of the esteem that the good ensures. By contrast, 
once esteem has been achieved when the asset has been eventually offered to the subject, this 
suffices for the emotion to dissolve, given that the desire for the deeper asset (esteem, that is) 
is now fulfilled. Hence, even though on a superficial level one can ascertain a plurality of goods 
from which envy can be moved, on a deeper level, the ultimate good at stake seems to be only 
one, namely, esteem recognition.  
 
This has an important consequence for the understanding of the emotion. The fact that the rival 
enjoys a good that has values recognized as important by the subject’s in-group members 
implicitly assigns social relevance to the rival. In fact, the rival – insofar as she enjoys the 
esteem of my in-group thanks to the possession of the good – is framed as an in-group member. 
The subject does not directly group-identify with the rival here, but because the rival is 
perceived as receiving esteem recognition from the subject’s in-group, the rival is also 
perceived as being a member of that in-group. For example, imagine that Nora, who belongs 
to one minority in the country where she lives, feels envy for her next-door neighbor Sana, who 
is a member of a different minority. Sana enjoys a better-paying job and a better social position 
than Nora, which signals to Nora that the society where they live confers a higher status to 
Sana’s group as opposed to Nora’s. In this example, Nora is framing Sana explicitly as an out-
group member, but at the same time she is implicitly taking both Sana and herself as members 
of the same referential in-group, as far as social esteem is concerned. But then, even if in an 
indirect and implicit way, the subject does group identify with the other – she does understand 
herself as a member of the same group to which the other belongs.  
 
The idea that group identification can come in different forms is not new in social psychology, 
where it has been ascertained that group identification comes in degrees, which have an impact 
on our affective life - for instance, on how we feel social or collective emotions (Brewer, 1991; 
Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). This idea has also been accommodated in the debate about 
collective intentionality, where difference in ‘degrees’ is replaced by a conceptual distinction 
between two different ways in which one can understand oneself as member of a group: either 
one can be a we-mode member or a pro-group I-mode member (Tuomela, 2007). The main 
idea being that, whereas a ‘we-moder’ is somebody who adopts a we-perspective (hence 
framing the world and acting from the perspective of her group), the pro-group-I-moder is 
somebody who acts, emotes and reasons from an I-perspective, while taking into consideration 
a concern for her group in her action, reasoning and emotions.  
 
These various distinctions parallel our talk of direct and indirect group identification. Being in 
the we-mode appears to be an important condition for envy: when there is low similarity 
between the envier and the rival, envy can be explained by the fact that the emoter perceives 
the world from the we-perspective. Accordingly, the other is directly framed as an in-group 
member – in doing so, the similarity gap is bypassed and salience is assigned even to low 
similarities. Yet, being in a pro-group-I-mode is always required for envy: not only the agent 
emotes based on a concern that fundamentally relates to her group, i.e., by the desire of being 
esteemed by her group. But also, she implicitly understands the other as an in-group member, 
as someone, that is, who – by excelling at exemplifying the values cherished by the group to 
which the subject belongs - enjoys its esteem recognition. Consequently, the emotion can be 





In this paper, we have defended three closely interrelated ideas about the emotion of envy. 
First, we have contrasted envy with benign envy by contending that (hostile) envy is a (single) 
kind of emotion, whereas emulative envy is the combination of two mental attitudes: desire 
and admiration. Envy is a single kind of emotion and not a combination of desire and hatred, 
because envy (in contradistinction to those two other states) displays self-reflexivity: envy 
always is about the self. Yet, envy is not only about the self, for it also is about the other - and 
this leads to our second claim: envy is a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion. To put another 
way, envy is a self-evaluative emotion, which inimically and aversively attends to the other. 
Sometimes, the phenomenological accent of the emotion is put on the other, making hostility 
the prominent accent of the emotion. Sometimes, this accent is on the self, making 
disempowerment and negative self-evaluation the stronger accent. Finally, an investigation 
into the good, which is the third intentional object of the emotion, led us to our third claim. 
Superficially, envy can be of a variety of goods, but on a deeper description, the main asset at 
stake in the emotion is esteem recognition by the subject’s in-group. Accordingly, envy is a 
group-based emotion in the sense that, in contrast to a widely-held view, this emotion is 
intrinsically social. In envy, the subject identifies with the rival at least in an indirect way, 
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i A somewhat analogous position to the one propounded in this paper is defended by Hans 
Bernhard Schmid in his 2012. By ‘sense of us’ we roughly understand a form of “[…] 
communal awareness that is the general precondition of collective intentionality” (Searle, 
2002, p. 104), we come back to this in Section 3.  
ii The “good” is not necessarily an entity, which is ontologically independent or numerically 
distinct from the rival. As a referee remarked, I can envy you for possessing many different 
qualities or features I covet. However, even in this case, all of these goods would occupy a 
single place in the intentional structure of envy, insofar as they are occasions for the same 
comparative evaluation of myself against you. 
                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                     
iii Rawls (1999, p. 464) writes: “A rational individual is not subject to envy,” but then he adds: 
“at least when the differences between himself and others are not thought to be the result of 
injustice and do not exceed certain limits”. 
iv What figures as ‘equality principle’ in this form of reasoning is not subject to the requirement 
of a formally correct or materially adequate definition of equality – common sense, not ethical 
theorizing, will regulate the understanding of that principle in envy. Approximately: if two 
persons have equal status, they must be treated equally, meaning that the distribution of goods 
must follow accordingly. Michael Tomasello and Frans de Waal have spearheaded empirical 
research showing that very young human children, as well as several species of primates and 
other animals, display inequity-averse behavior, which indicates that understanding and using 
an equality principle does not require very advanced conceptual thinking (for a review, see 
Brosnan, 2013; Tomasello & Warneken, 2008). We come back to the notion of equality at the 
end of this section. Note also that we are not presupposing that the subject must run the 
inferences based on this principle consciously. 
v This may be one of the reasons why envy is considered a capital sin in the Abrahamic 
religions: the subject, in contesting God’s distribution of goods, claims for herself the right to 
evaluate God’s work. The subject, hence, mistrusts God and lacks gratitude (see Schimmel, 
2008). 
vi Sometimes, the awareness that, objectively, the rival deserves the good because of her merit, 
can cause the meta-emotion of shame often associated with envy. The criticism that the rival 
doesn’t deserve the good, implied in envy, is then immediately revealed to the subject as 
unjustified (and yet not dismissible), giving rise to shame: the subject is ashamed of 
experiencing envy, and the feelings of hostility associated with it, because the subject knows 
that there is nothing one can blame the other person for, and still one feels hostility as if the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other was somehow blameworthy. (We are very thankful to Anna Bortolan for pushing us on 
this point.) 
vii Before embarking in this investigation, let us add a final note on the comparison between 
benign and malign envy by emphasizing that, despite their differences, these two emotions still 
retain an important similarity. As we have seen, malicious envy is associated with the 
motivation to harm the position of the rival, whereas benign envy is associated with the 
motivation to improve oneself by moving upward. However, both emotions align insofar as, in 
them, the subject attempts to dissolve the (perceived) position of inferiority with respect to the 
rival. In this sense they can be considered a part of the same group of emotions.  
viii Indeed (and at risk of oversimplifying), hatred is directed at its target in virtue of the 
disvalue(s) it exemplifies, not of the merits it possesses (Brudholm, 2010).  
ix  In a phenomenological understanding of the term, all experiences are self-conscious insofar 
as they are given for an experiencer (see Zahavi, 2005), and therefore in this sense all emotions 
would be self-conscious. But this is not what the term means here. 
x Developmental psychology confirms the conjecture that envy is a self-conscious emotion: in 
fact, envy aligns with other self-conscious emotions insofar as it emerges from the age of 21 
months – together with other self-conscious phenomena like self-recognition and self-
objectification in the mirror (see Rochat, 2014, p. 220).  
xi Many authors cash out the negative self-assessment implied in envy in terms of inferiority, 
but as Anna Bortolan rightly pointed out to us, this is potentially misleading. Compare envy 
with another emotion that does involve a feeling of inferiority: shame. In envy, the purported 
feeling of inferiority is confined to a specific point of rivalry with the other, but one feels equal 
to them in all other respects. The difference is perceived against a background of obvious 
similarities and experienced as undeserved. The sense of inferiority in envy is always localized 
and relative to the other, and so it might be better described as a feeling of (comparative) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
disempowerment. In fact, a feeling of thorough inferiority seems to prevent envy (see Smith & 
Kim, 2007, p. 51). In shame, by contrast, the feeling of inferiority is more generalized and 
crippling: one feels oneself reduced to and entirely defined by a shameful characteristic 
(Montes Sánchez, 2014).  
xii Note that some languages clearly differentiate between benign and malicious envy. For 
example, Japanese expresses benign envy with the term 羨ましい or うらやましい 
(urayamashii): this term is commonly used in everyday parlance, it does not convey hostility 
and can be self-attributed. In addition, the family of terms 妬み (netami),  妬ましい 
(netamashii) and 嫉妬 (shitto), that share the same radical (妬), expresses hostile envy: they 
are very seldom used in the first person sentence, neither singular nor plural, and basically are 
employed only when envy is attributed to somebody else. Protasi (2016) mentions that similar 
distinctions are present in Dutch, Thai, Polish, and Arabic. 
xiii Protasi (2016), too, discusses envy’s oscillation, but in different terms – for her the 
oscillation is between the good and the rival. We do not consider the good to be an element 
that is able to induce oscillation in the emotion, given that we have established in section 1 that 
the good is deemed to be not acquirable by the envier. 
xiv Of course, all kinds of emotions can be induced by others, in the broad sense of ‘caused’ by 
them. For example, if I am waiting in line to buy tickets at the cinema and you jump the queue, 
I will get angry at you, and my anger can be described as caused by you. But this is a 
paradigmatic case of anger, an emotion caused by another and directed at another. Anger at 
oneself is the special case. For self-conscious emotions, the opposite is the case, they are 
paradigmatically about oneself and brought about by facts about the emoter’s situation: her 
actions, her traits, or things that befall her. The technical term ‘hetero-induced’, which in this 
sense is only applicable to self-conscious emotions, is meant to designate those special cases 
where one performs a self-assessment based on another person’s actions, traits or situation, like 
                                                                                                                                                                     
you feeling proud of your daughter’s achievement. In the literature, these instances are often 
referred to as ‘vicarious’ emotions, but we prefer not to use this term for reasons given in Salice 
& Montes Sánchez 2016. 
xv Here, again, we are thankful to Anna Bortolan, who has brought our attention to the 
differences among these evaluations. 
xvi It is a current matter of debate when children develop the ability to group identify: it is 
relatively uncontroversial that, by the age of 3, pre-school children accomplish a shift towards 
a “socio-centric mode of reasoning” (see Dunham & Emory, 2014). But studies into in-group 
favoritism (which is generally considered as a by-effect of group identification) show that 
children from the age of 14 months understand and, in certain cases, orient their action on the 
difference between out-group and in-group (see Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; 
Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). Relatedly, children of 21-27 months of age 
engage in joint action (Warneken, Gräfenhain, & Tomasello, 2012), which is an ability that has 
been explained by appealing to their capacity of group identifying (Pacherie, 2013). 
xvii Although we use the term ‘value’ in this paper, nothing in our argument relies on the 
metaphysical status of values. The reader, who refuses an axiologically robust notion of value, 
can reformulate the corresponding thoughts by employing locutions such as ‘evaluation.’ 
xviii We thank Antonio Gómez Ramos for pushing us to clarify our discussion of recognition 
and bringing Neuhouser to our attention. 
xix Note that this is not to deny that envy, just like all emotions, is infused by a fundamental 
concern about the emoter’s personal well-being. To put our claim another way, the dimension 
of the well-being at stake in envy is intrinsically tied to the esteem of the others and, in 
particular, of the emoter’s (perceived) in-group members. 
